

# Councillor conduct and meeting practices

A new framework



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Councillor conduct and meeting practices

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# The need for change – returning local democracy to councils

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Strong and thriving communities need effective local government. No other level of government is as close to the issues and people.

Effective local government comes when councillors are visibly in control of their councils. How councillors act and how appropriately and transparently decisions are made at meetings is critical in demonstrating to the community that their elected representatives understand the consequences of their decisions, and then make the best possible decisions they can for their community as a whole.

Unfortunately, the existing councillor conduct framework is not delivering on the need for transparency or the necessary degree of respect in the community for the role that councillors have.

Closed council briefing sessions are being used to make decisions away from the public view. Council debates on issues are too often personal slanging matches, rather than forums for robust but respectful discussions on what is best for the community.

Similarly, we have seen a growth in the number of complaints, often over trivial issues. Data from the Office of Local Government (OLG) has shown there has been 4289 complaints over the last 3 years (2020/21 to 2022/23) through the code of conduct process. Overall:

- 420 were referred for preliminary enquiries and then discontinued
- 136 were investigated as potential pecuniary interest matters
- 102 were investigated as potential misconduct (not pecuniary interest)
- 36 related to public interest disclosures, and
- 2 related to political donations

But of these thousands of complaints, in the years since 2020/21 OLG has:

- taken action against 14 councillors by way of a suspension or reprimand
- referred 4 councillors to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) for misconduct, and
- disqualified and dismissed one councillor on the basis of Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) recommendations

The volume of frivolous complaints is crowding out the ability of the OLG and the sector to adequately deal with councillors who abuse their office or cause serious governance problems. It is critical the framework that governs both the behaviour and meeting practices of councillors ensures the community can observe and comment on the behaviour of councillors, instead of inhibiting the operation and function of local democracy.

## The weaknesses of existing frameworks

The simple, but compelling premise is local councils should be accountable to their community with council staff being accountable to their councillors, through the General Manager. The best way to achieve this aim is for councils to provide strong and effective representation, leadership, planning and decision making. Unfortunately, this simple concept has been lost.

How councillors behave, how they deliberate and the responsibilities they hold should be modelled on how members of Parliament are expected to behave and act. As the governing body, councillors should act fairly, ethically and without bias in the interests of the local community, and they should be responsible employers and provide a consultative and supportive working environment for staff. A criticism made about the current framework for councillor conduct or meeting practices is that they do not reflect local government's status as an independent third tier of government: it allows an unelected State Government official to determine penalties and guilt thus undermining the status of local government.

While most local councils and local councillors do the right thing with the best intent, there are some councillors who are not so motivated. In these cases, the current councillor behavioural framework, as implemented in NSW, does not facilitate the best outcomes or resolve issues.

In relation to complaint management, it is not considered acceptable to create better complaint management pathways for the processing of code of conduct complaints. The current code of conduct simply enables too many complaints about councillors, all too often for political or vexatious reasons.

It is for this reason that the Government has embarked upon a new approach that refocuses the limited resources of the State on those concerns that matter most: serious misbehaviours and attempts by councillors to enrich themselves through their office.

Weaknesses of the current framework include:

- The councillor conduct framework distracts from, rather than enhances, robust democratic debate. Complaints are weaponised for political reasons, or to silence dissent from other elected representatives.
- Councillors and community members report dissatisfaction with the process for resolving code of conduct complaints – being expensive, overly legal, prone to political sparring and not timely, with average timeframes exceeding 12 months and more than 24 months if they are then referred to OLG for further investigation.
- Issues are not being addressed and resolved at the local level – instead complaints are escalated unnecessarily to the State Government to resolve because of the view that public censure from the local council is not a ‘strong enough’ punishment.
- Communities and councillors report that council decision making is not transparent – with decisions being seen as made behind closed doors, information not being provided or withheld, too much use of closed to the public briefings or councils going into closed sessions for no adequate rationale.
- Bad councillor behaviour is not considered to have been addressed quickly enough and when sanctions are imposed it is too late or of little consequence.
- There is a lack of clarity around OLG's role as the sector regulator – taking too long to resolve matters and not focussing on the important financial and government concerns in the sector, instead spending time focussed on individual councillor behaviour.
- OLG reports challenges in relying on the reports of council conduct reviewers – investigations into councillors need to be done afresh, the process is cumbersome with multiple feedback loops and serious sanctions can only come from suspensions handed down by NCAT.

With so much focus on the bad behaviour of a limited number of councillors there is not enough attention given to the good work that councillors do. The role of a councillor is a noble public service, and the local government behavioural framework should support those who seek to do the right thing and punish those that are not so motivated.

## Options for a better approach

Improving the councillor conduct framework and the meeting practices of councils can be achieved but will require changes to the Local Government Act 1993 (the Local Government Act), as well as updating the various regulations, codes and policies that apply. Some of the work to update the regulations and codes can be done quickly, while others requiring legislative change will take some time.

This paper provides an overview of the proposed new approach to both the councillor conduct framework and meeting practices. The proposals are to:

- Make OLG directly responsible for dealing with pecuniary interest and significant non-pecuniary conflicts of interest, with sanctions (suspensions and loss of pay) being determined by an appropriate tribunal or body,
- Refer behavioural based concerns about councillor conduct to a State-wide panel of experienced councillors to judge their peers,
- Reset the code of conduct to be similar to Parliamentary Codes, making it clear the expected patterns of councillor behaviour,
- Ensure the community can observe local democratic processes by banning closed to the public briefing sessions, while at the same time restoring the dignity and prestige of the council chamber.

These changes are only proposed for councillors and there is no change proposed for the code of conduct for Local Government staff. Feedback from stakeholders is that the existing code of conduct of staff remains fit for purpose and is largely effective.

## Seeking your views

This discussion paper has been prepared to seek the views of the community, key stakeholders and the local government sector about the proposed changes.

Submissions will be accepted to **COB Friday 15 November 2024**.

All input received through this consultation process **may be made publicly available**. Please let us know in your submission if you **do not want** your name and personal details published.

As part of the consultation process, we may need to share your information with people outside OLG, including other public authorities and government agencies. We may also use your email to send you notifications about further feedback opportunities or the outcome of the consultation.

There may also be circumstances when OLG is required by law to release information (for example, in accordance with the requirements of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009). There is a privacy policy located on OLG's website that explains how some data is automatically collected (such as your internet protocol (IP) address) whenever you visit OLG's website. The link to that policy is <https://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/about-us/privacy-policy/>.

Further information about how to make a submission is provided at section 7 of this paper.

# What are the principles of change?

In preparing the proposed reforms the following principles have guided the discussion and the intent of the changes:

- **Council leadership and decision making is paramount** – it is critical that the sector, as the third tier of government, is given independence to make decisions in the best interests of the community
- **Freedom of speech** – as elected officials, councillors have the constitutional right and democratic responsibility to speak freely about issues affecting their local community and to advocate for the interests of that community
- **Transparency and accountability** – as a democracy councils need to hear, consider and debate issues in an open manner
- **Significant penalties should only be imposed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body** – to ensure procedural fairness and thorough testing of allegations, significant penalties should be given by bodies such as the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal
- **A strong and proportionate local government regulator** – the role of OLG should be to create the framework for local government, ensure councils, joint organisations (JOs), and county councils have the capacity to operate within the framework so that the regulator intervenes as rarely as needed
- **Subsidiarity** – decisions are made at the level closest to those impacted by those decisions
- **Justice is timely and proportionate** – where allegations are made, they should be heard, tested and dealt with as quickly as possible.

## Question

**Are we missing anything in the principles of change?**

# Potential changes to the code of conduct and oath of office

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The key proposed reform for the councillor behavioural framework is to move to a streamlined, aspirational Code of Conduct. This is equivalent to the Code of Conduct framework for NSW Members of Parliament available [here](#) and [here](#).

The aspirational Code of Conduct would clearly and succinctly outline the behavioural expectations of local councillors (approximately 2-3 pages) in easy-to-understand language. It would then be supported by a clearer framework and definitions for misbehaviour of elected officials.

The aspirational Code of Conduct would not set out the definitions of misbehaviour as these would be legislated as explained in later sections of this discussion paper.

Separating the behavioural expectations in a Code of Conduct from definitions of misbehaviour reflects a positive approach to councillor behaviour. The separation also recognises that the majority of councillors want to do the right thing and they should have easy access to the standards expected of them.

The revamped Code of Conduct could also be aligned to the Oath of Office for local councillors ensuring that the behavioural standards and expectations are clear and understood when a councillor takes office. The existing framework can make it difficult to understand the behavioural expectations and standards upon councillors.

Importantly, the revamped Code of Conduct will not seek to restrain the ability of a councillor to speak publicly on matters pertaining to their council, even when that councillor is disagreeing with, or being critical of, the decisions of the majority.

It is proposed to make the new Code of Conduct an aspirational code of expected behaviours instead of enforceable for local councillors.

## Question

**What are the key elements of an aspirational Code of Conduct that should be enshrined?**

## Question

**What are your views about aligning the Oath of Office to the revamped Code of Conduct?**



# Potential changes to the definitions and assessment of councillor misbehaviour

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The current Local Government Act defines councillor misconduct as a breach of the Local Government Act or other regulatory provisions, which includes the Code of Conduct. This means that it is difficult for the average person to understand the definition of misconduct as they need to reference several other regulatory instruments and policy documents to determine what constitutes.

It is proposed in the revised framework that misbehaviour will be more clearly defined and articulated within the Local Government Act, with the reference to regulations and other statutory instruments only for further enunciation or explanation.

These definitions, which are described in later sections would cover:

- Pecuniary conflicts of interests, (for example decisions that financially benefit the councillor or a close associate),
- Significant non-pecuniary conflicts of interests (for example where a councillor participates in a decision and a direct advantage/disadvantage is created for a person or company the councillor is friendly with or associated with), and
- Councillor misbehaviour in public office (for example, poor conduct in meetings leading to exclusion by the Mayor or Chair of the Committee).

This will make clearer to all participants in the local government sector what is considered misbehaviour by a local councillor.

The definitions of misbehaviour do not change the other legislative requirements. Communities, residents, workers and fellow councillors expect their elected officials to act in an appropriate and ethical way, including observing workplace health and safety, environmental and criminal laws. If there is an offence or complaint under these other laws, people should

seek redress from the appropriate regulator including SafeWork, Independent Commission Against Corruption or the NSW Police.

The behavioural standards in the revamped Code of Conduct will reinforce the expectation that councillors are community leaders and therefore exemplars of good behaviour. As community leaders it is also expected councillors will meet legislative obligations. Therefore, misbehaviour only needs to be defined as those issues which go to the nature of councillors as elected officials, being conflicts of interest or misbehaviour in public office.

These are the expectations that are upon councillors because of the public trust that is placed in them as elected officials. In this way it more closely reflects, with appropriate adjustments the framework that applies to other elected officials in other levels of Government.

## Conflicts of interest

The first proposed limb of the revised misbehaviour definition is a councillor's failure to manage a conflict of interest.

Management of conflicts of interest is important to ensure that councillors act and are seen to act in the public good, not for private benefit or personal gain. Conflicts of interest arise when there is a conflict, perception or potential of a conflict between an official's private interests and public duty.

The test for pecuniary interests is quite clear as it is an objective test; would a councillor or one of their close associates (spouse, family members), receive a financial benefit as a result of a decision. However, testing whether there is a non-pecuniary conflict of interest is more challenging.

## Pecuniary interests

It is proposed to align the definition of pecuniary interests for NSW councillors with those that are utilised and defined for NSW members of parliament, requiring disclosure of the following interests:

- Real property – property in which councillors have an ‘interest’
- Sources of income – all income over \$500 other than salary of office
- Gifts – all gifts of cumulative value of more than \$500
- Contributions to travel – of value of more than \$250 (including flight upgrades)
- Interests and positions in corporations – eg stocks and shares, directorships
- Positions in unions and professional or business organisations
- Debts – of cumulative value of more than \$500, excluding home loans or debts for goods and services disposed of within a year
- Dispositions of property
- Engagement to provide a service involving use of a councillor’s position and
- Discretionary disclosures.

It is proposed that the interests for disclosure by the councillor are similarly extended to the interest of a spouse or de facto partner, relative, or partner or employer, or a company or other body of which the councillor, or their nominee, partner or employer, is a shareholder or member. This extends only to the extent the councillor is aware or should be aware of such interests.

It is proposed there remains an absolute prohibition on a councillor being involved in any matter before council where a pecuniary conflict of interest exists, unless otherwise determined via regulation.

It is also proposed to give extended investigation powers to OLG to investigate and request information on corporate structures such as trust or companies to

determine underlying beneficial ownership and interests.

OLG, as the agency responsible for investigating alleged breaches of pecuniary interests, needs clear powers to compel the production of information and/or records, to ensure that pecuniary interest returns are provided and made publicly available. If there is non-compliance with an OLG direction, which may include the requirement to make a declaration, remedies such as penalty infringement notices (PIN) should be available to ensure cooperation with investigative processes.

### Question

**Is the proposed pecuniary interest framework appropriate? Is anything missing?**

## Non-pecuniary interests

A conflict of interest does not necessarily have to be financial in nature. It could also arise from familial or personal relationships, affiliations or memberships. It is equally important that such conflicts are managed appropriately to ensure that decision making is seen to be transparent and remains in the public interest.

An interested and informed observer should be confident a decision made by a councillor is free from bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. This means that any concerns about a potentially significant conflict of interest should be declared and appropriately managed.

The nature and breadth of non-pecuniary interests naturally means that the framework for management of such interests is more nuanced, with the management approach often dependent upon the individual circumstances of the case.

It is also important to recognise that councillors, as representatives of their community, reside within their community, so memberships of clubs, congregational

memberships etc should not automatically be seen as conflicts of interest.

If a decision of a councillor directly advantages (or disadvantages) a particular individual or organisation the councillor is friendly with or associates with, then that can be a conflict that should be publicly declared, if the councillor considered it of minor consequence, it wasn't controversial, or the councillor did not hold the casting vote.

Alternatively, if a decision of a councillor directly advantages (or disadvantages) a particular individual or organisation the councillor is friendly with or associates with, then that can be a conflict requiring the councillor to recuse themselves from being involved in the decision-making process if there was a major advantage or disadvantage (or potential for), if it was controversial or the vote of the councillor was critical.

The appropriate test for whether a non-pecuniary interest should be declared is based on an objective test, not in the mind of the individual who is subject to the conflict of interest. The test is whether a reasonable and informed person would perceive that the councillor could be influenced by a private interest when carrying out their official functions in relation to a matter.

Whether the councillor abstains themselves from a decision, or decides to participate, the continued and timely disclosure of interests is critical. Disclosure ensures the community is aware of any potential conflicts and how the councillor is managing and responding to the issue.

Councillors should remain as vigilant about disclosure of non-pecuniary interests as they are about pecuniary interests.

### Question

**Do you agree with the principles of what constitutes a significant or major non-pecuniary interest?**

## Property developers and real estate agents

The NSW Government has made a commitment to ensure the conflicts of interest that exist between a councillors' public duties to make decisions on behalf of communities and the private interests that exist in securing a profit as a developer or real estate agent are addressed. A simple change to ban developers or real estate agents from being councillors is not possible as it infringes the right to political free speech implied by the Australian Constitution.

Ordinarily conflicts of interest are managed through declarations and withdrawing from decision making. However, in the case of property development and real estate interests, where so much of what a council does is related to land and the potential for speculation in the changes of land value arising from planning, development and infrastructure decisions, it can be impossible to isolate the precise interests that would drive a councillor's decision.

Without some way of managing these conflicts, the community confidence that planning, development and infrastructure decisions are taken transparently in the public interest will erode. Given the importance of planning, development and infrastructure decisions to resolving the housing crisis, driving the move to net zero through the electrification of the economy and building community resilience to disasters, it is critical to restore confidence.

To address this concern, an alternative means of managing the inherent conflict of councillors undertaking real estate and development business activity is being considered which involves requiring councillors to divest themselves from real estate or development business activities and contractual obligations.

Legislation is being drafted that will:

- identify how developers and real estate agents are identified,
- create the obligation to divest and not enter into real estate or development business arrangements through contracts,
- establish the penalties, including disqualification, where a councillor engages in contractual arrangements with real estate agents or developers,
- ensure there are exemptions so councillors can buy and sell their own property using a real estate agent, and
- create transitional arrangements for the introduction of the new obligations.

### Question

**Are there any other specific features that should be included to address concerns about councillors undertaking real estate and development business activities?**

## Councillor misbehaviour in public office

The third proposed component of a revised definition of misconduct is misbehaviour in public office.

Misbehaviour in public office would cover behaviour which is inconsistent or outside of the norms of behaviour expected from a councillor, particularly given their role as a community leader. Given the discussion is about behaviour rather than action, there is a much greater degree of interpretation, and it is appropriate that councillors judge their fellow councillors on whether they could be considered to have misbehaved.

There would be three limbs to this proposed misbehaviour definition being conduct that:

- Is unbecoming of a councillor
- Brings council into disrepute; and/or
- Is assessed as being outside the norms and expectations of a sitting councillor.

The first two tests of this framework are established legal concepts with existing case law and precedents.

Unbecoming conduct means behaviour more serious than slight, and of a material and pronounced character. It means conduct morally unfitting and unworthy, rather than merely inappropriate or unsuitable, misbehaviour which is more than opposed to good taste or propriety. Conduct unbecoming refers to the conduct that is contrary to the public interests, or which harms his/her standing of the profession in the eyes of the public. Examples can be referenced in *Oei v The Australian Golf Club [2016] NSWSC 846*.

To bring something into disrepute is to lower the reputation of the profession or organisation in the eyes of ordinary members of the public to a significant extent. It is a higher threshold than the test of bringing an individual into disrepute - (*Zubkov v FINA (2007) CAS 2007/A/1291*).

The third limb of the misbehaviour definition allows consideration of behaviours and actions of a sitting councillor which are considered egregious or problematic that are otherwise not captured by the other elements of the definitions.

As this is a test of appropriate behaviour, the determination of whether the misbehaviour occurred would be undertaken by the peers of the councillor. This would involve the formation of an 'Local Government Privileges Committee' (Privileges Committee) of senior and experienced mayors and ex-mayors from across NSW to meet and assess the complaints made against councillors. The Privileges Committee would be supported by OLG, but decisions would be made by the mayors or ex-mayors on the Privileges Committee who would draw on their expertise as mayors, as well as having served at least two council terms as a councillor.

There would also be an opportunity to apply these principles to poor behaviour in meetings, particularly where a councillor has failed to comply with the directions given by the mayor or Privileges Committee Chair.

### Question

**Is this the appropriate threshold to face a Privileges Committee?**

### Question

**How else can complaints be minimised?**

## Addressing inappropriate lobbying

A number of investigations by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has led to recommendations to put in place measures to address concerns about lobbying of councillors. ICAC has been concerned about councillors having relationships with development applicants that pose a conflict of interest, concerns with councillors meeting with development applicants in private settings to discuss their applications, and concerns about councillors receiving gifts and inducements as part of lobbying activities to improperly influence council decision-making.

Lobbying is an important feature of democratic representative government, and all councillors get lobbied by residents, businesses and community groups. However, inappropriate lobbying that isn't declared presents certain risks and can lead to corrupt behaviour or improper decision-making. On the recommendation of ICAC to address these risks, OLG is developing lobbying guidelines and a model policy on lobbying for councils to adopt that will:

- address how professional lobbyists are identified and the obligations on councils and councillors if they met a professional lobbyist,
- set out inappropriate behaviours when being lobbied,
- identify steps to be taken to ensure transparency,
- require council officials to report inappropriate or corrupt lobbying behaviours to the councils general manager.

The development of lobbying guidelines and a model policy on lobbying will ensure councillors and councils understand these risks and have effective controls in place to address them.

### Question

**What key features should be included in lobbying guidelines and a model policy?**

# Dispute resolution and penalty framework

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Consistent with the principles outlined earlier, it is proposed that there be a significant change to the dispute resolution and penalties framework for misbehaviour.

While the overall intent is to reduce the weaponisation of the complaints process and reduce the number of complaints, there is also a need for more timely resolution of matters and ensure that the limited investigation and regulator resources are directed to the more significant misbehaviour matters.

There is also an opportunity to bring the dispute resolution framework more into line with that used in other levels of government.

The approach being proposed is to create clear separation between the process for consideration of conflicts of interest and the processes for consideration of misbehaviour. This has the benefit of removing general managers from being central to the complaint process.

Under the reforms, the investigation of serious conflicts of interest would be put entirely into the hands of OLG. The approach also removes the existing 'two step' process of referrals to conduct reviewers and then OLG.

There would be no investigations of misbehaviour, instead councillors would be required to demonstrate to their peers why their actions, which may have led to the complaint, were appropriate to the circumstances.

To implement these new approaches, changes to the systems and structures of investigation and complaints handling are needed.

## Abolishing the 'two step process'

The existing process for complaints is set out in the Procedures for the Administration of the Model Code of Conduct.

In simple terms, the complaint process involves the general manager or the mayor receiving a complaint, determining whether the complaint is valid and referring the matter to a complaints coordinator within the council, who will in turn appoint an external conduct reviewer. Once the conduct reviewer investigates the issue, interviews the complainant and the subject of the complaint, as well as any other relevant people, provides a report to the council and the council makes a decision, many months can pass.

As it currently stands, if OLG, receives a referral following the council consideration of a complaint, they are then expected to rely on the investigation report of the conduct reviewer to make an assessment. However, investigation reports prepared by conduct reviewers may satisfy the evidentiary standard required for a councillor to be censured but may not satisfy the higher evidentiary standard required to support disciplinary action under the misbehaviour provisions under the Local Government Act, such as suspension or disqualification. OLG's experience is that rarely can it rely on these reports and must instead recommence an investigation process if it decides to pursue the matter.

Instead of this existing two-step process:

- Complaints about conflict of interest matters would be made directly to OLG, and
- Complaints about misbehaviour would be made directly to the Local Government Privileges Committee via a dedicated webform.

Under the proposed approach, there would be no role for privately hired investigators to determine whether the Code of Conduct has been breached.

## Giving OLG the power to issue penalty infringement notices

In order to ensure information is provided to OLG more effectively, it is proposed to enable OLG the discretion to issue penalty infringement notices (PINs) for minor or insignificant breaches of the conflicts of interest declarations. The PINs would be primarily utilised in circumstances where the breach is considered minor or administrative in nature – for example an inadvertent failure to lodge a return of interests.

This change to PINs is designed to allow a quick process for dealing with minor matters to free up limited regulatory resources while still ensuring that sanction for important matters is provided.

Like all other PIN provisions in other NSW legislations there would be the ability for the PIN to be appealed or special circumstances to be considered. Where the breach was considered more serious in nature then it can be referred to an appropriate tribunal or body for more significant punishment.

### Question

**What level of PIN is appropriate?**

## NSW Local Government Privileges Committee

Along with the PIN framework, it is also proposed to create a Local Government Privileges Committee (Privileges Committee) to examine all allegations of misbehaviour in public office. This would replace the existing code of conduct review framework and instead aim to provide a speedy process for resolution and assessment of behavioural complaints against councillors. It also allows for the sector to better govern itself. The Privileges Committee would only examine issues of misbehaviour, not conflicts of interest.

The Privileges Committee would be made up by a group of experienced mayors and ex-mayors from across NSW to ensure that a variety of perspectives and experiences are considered. The Privileges Committee would be supported by a small Secretariat from OLG who could be delegated the power by the Privileges Committee to dismiss matters that are vexatious, trivial, where the Privileges Committee lacks jurisdiction, or where there is an alternative remedy available.

The Privileges Committee process would be paid for by either individual councillors or their councils, dependent on the outcome.

Penalties that could be imposed by the Privileges Committee are as follows:

- Censure of the councillor
- Warning of the councillor
- Where referred following misbehaviour in a council meeting, a potential loss of sitting fees
- Referral to an appropriate tribunal or body for more serious sanction, including suspension or disallowance.

As noted above if the breach is deemed serious then the Privileges Committee would have the power to refer a matter to the OLG for preparation of a brief for an appropriate tribunal or body.

### Question

**Are the penalties proposed appropriate, and are there any further penalties that should be considered?**

## Referral of significant sanctions to appropriate tribunal or body

Under the existing processes for consideration of complaints, OLG, in particular the Departmental Chief Executive (or their delegate), can suspend a councillor for between 1-3 months with a consequential loss of sitting fees. This creates the situation where a public servant is sitting in judgement on an elected official. Where a greater suspension is appropriate, the Departmental Chief Executive may refer the matter to an appropriate tribunal or body.

To remedy the concerns about whether it is appropriate for an unelected official to stand in judgment on an elected councillor, it is proposed that any significant sanction, such as suspension, significant fine or disqualification from office, can only be undertaken by an appropriate tribunal or body.

This reduces the existing power of the Departmental Chief Executive to impose penalties. It reflects the principle that significant sanctions, including suspension, should only be imposed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body. It also removes the dual roles of the head of OLG, meaning OLG's focus is on preparing the brief of evidence for consideration by the appropriate tribunal or body.

The role of the appropriate tribunal or body would therefore be to look at all serious misconduct matters that have either been referred by the Privileges Committee, appeals from PINs or referrals of conflict of interest matters from the OLG.

### Question

**Are the existing sanctions available under the Local Government Act sufficient?**

### Question

**Should decisions on sanctions for councillors be made by the Departmental Chief Executive or a formal tribunal with independent arbitrators and a hearing structure?**



# Restoring dignity to council meetings

A council chamber is a chamber of democracy, and the mayor as figurehead represents the authority of that council.

Unfortunately, many council meetings are conducted without the appropriate level of dignity or reverence for tradition that suggests the importance of the debate and the need for civility. Councillors are not expected to agree with each other, in fact debate is encouraged, but the debate should be fair and respectful.

A council meeting, and the council chamber itself, should see meetings conducted with dignity. Unfortunately, there are too many examples where the dignity of council meetings has been lost, either because councillors are not appropriately reverential and respectful, or the manner of debate is lowered by inappropriate chamber design or meeting practices.

## Proposed reforms to the Model Code of Meeting Practice

To restore the prestige and dignity of the council chamber reforms to the meeting code of practice are being developed to support the mayor in exercising their statutory responsibility to preside at meetings and to ensure meetings are conducted in an orderly and dignified manner.

The proposed reforms will confer the power on mayors to expel councillors for acts of disorder and to remove the councillor's entitlement to receive a fee for the month in which they have been expelled from a meeting.

As a further deterrent against disorderly conduct, councillors will also be required to apologise for an act of disorder at the meeting at which it occurs and, if they fail to comply at that meeting, at each subsequent meeting until they comply. Each failure to apologise becomes an act of misbehaviour and will see the councillor lose their entitlement to receive their fee for a further month.

To provide a check against misuse of the power of expulsion and subsequent loss of entitlement of a fee, councillors will be entitled to a right of review.

Councillors will also be expected to stand, where able to do so, when addressing a meeting and when the mayor enters the chamber.

The proposed reforms will also expand the grounds for mayors to expel members of the public from the chamber for acts of disorder and enable the issuing of a PIN where members of the public refuse to leave a meeting after being expelled.

### Question

**Are there any other powers that need to be granted to the mayor or chair of the relevant meeting to deal with disorderly behaviour?**

## Banning briefing sessions

A practice has recently developed in local government where councillors receive briefings from staff that are closed to the public.

As an example, development applications should be considered in the public domain. However, councillors receive private briefings from the council planners before they are dealt with in the public forum of a council or committee meeting. Consequently, members of the public impacted by the council's decision have no idea what the councillors have been told or what has been discussed.

To promote transparency and address the corruption risks identified by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) that can arise from a lack of transparency, it is proposed that councils will no longer be permitted to hold pre-meeting briefing sessions in the absence of the public.

Any material provided to councillors, other than the mayor, that will affect or impact or be taken into account by councillors in their deliberations or decisions made on behalf of the community must be provided to them in either a committee meeting or council meeting. This restriction will not apply to mayors. As the leader of the organisation, the mayor needs to have candid conversations with the general manager outside of formal meetings.

To further promote transparency, the proposed reforms will also extend the period that recordings of council and committee meetings must be maintained on a council's website.

### Question

**Are there any other measures needed to improve transparency in councillor deliberations and decision making?**

# How to provide feedback?

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This discussion paper has been released through the Office of Local Government's communication channels and on the Government's Have your Say Website.

You can make submissions on this proposed framework by **COB Friday 15 November 2024**. Further information is available on OLG website at <https://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/councils/misconduct-and-intervention/councillor-conduct-framework/>.

Submissions can be made online here - <https://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/councils/misconduct-and-intervention/councillor-conduct-framework/>

OR

in writing to: [councillorconduct@olg.nsw.gov.au](mailto:councillorconduct@olg.nsw.gov.au)

OR

Locked Bag 3015 NOWRA NSW 2541

Submissions must be clearly labelled "Councillor Conduct Framework Review"

Please direct any inquiries to the OLG's Strategic Policy Unit at [councillorconduct@olg.nsw.gov.au](mailto:councillorconduct@olg.nsw.gov.au) or on (02) 4428 4100.

## Next Steps

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Feedback from this consultation process will be carefully analysed and incorporated to finalise the revised councillor conduct framework.

OLG will then look to finalise necessary draft legislation, regulations and materials for implementation of the revised model over the coming year. Consultation will continue with the local government on the implementation of the revised framework.

Information about the progress of the Councillor Conduct Framework Review will be available on the [OLG website](#).

